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NOT PRECEDENTIAL

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT
________
No. 13-2593
_________
ERIC MOTTO,
Appellant
v.
WAL-MART STORES EAST, LP
________
On Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania
(D.C. No. 5-11-cv-02357)
District Judge: Mary A. McLaughlin
_______
Submitted Under Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a)
April 7, 2014
Before: HARDIMAN, SLOVITER, and BARRY, Circuit Judges
(Filed: April 7, 2014 )
______________
OPINION
_______________

Sloviter, Circuit Judge.
Eric Motto appeals the District Court’s dismissal on summary judgment of his
claim that Wal-Mart Stores East, LP, fired him in retaliation for making protected
complaints about discrimination and sexual harassment in the workplace, in violation of
42 U.S.C. § 1981. The District Court held that Motto did not establish a prima facie case
of retaliation because he did not show a causal connection between his complaints and his
termination. It also found that even if he could make a prima facie case, he did not
present evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Wal-Mart’s stated
non-discriminatory reason for firing Motto, that he threatened another store employee
with violence, was pretextual. Motto argues that the short time period of eleven days
between his sexual harassment complaint and his termination is sufficient to establish
causation. He also argues that disputes as to material facts exist that preclude summary
judgment. We will affirm the judgment of the District Court. 1
I.
Because we write primarily for the benefit of the parties, and because Motto only
appeals his retaliation claim, we will recount only the facts essential to that claim. Motto,
who self-identifies as part-Caucasian and part-African American, was employed as an
assembler at a Wal-Mart retail store in Temple, Pennsylvania. In this position, he
assembled merchandise, answered customer questions, and sometimes assisted customers
by carrying merchandise out to their cars. Of relevance to the issues in this case is Wal-
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The District Court had jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331. This court has
jurisdiction over the final order of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.
2

Mart’s Corporate Policy PD-48 (the “Workplace Violence Policy”) which states that
“threats of violence” is unacceptable and can lead to termination from the company.
In February 2008, Motto requested a change in his shift schedule so that he could
rehearse with his band. Unknown to him, the change was not entered in the store’s
system, but each time the issue arose, Motto was given the time requested. In October
2008, Motto was scheduled to work late because the store was busy, and Motto was late
for band rehearsals. As a result, he was released from the band. At a meeting in January
2009 with the new store manager, Robin Olshenske, Motto learned that his earlier
scheduling request had not been entered into the store’s system. In contrast, the request
of a scheduling change by a Caucasian employee had been entered. Two days later,
Motto was informed by Olshenske that his schedule request was entered in the system.
Motto filed complaints with state and federal agencies, including the charge that WalMart had engaged in impermissible race discrimination by failing to formally adjust his
work schedule between April 2008 and January 2009. Neither agency acted affirmatively
on Motto’s complaints.
Over a period of months in the summer and fall of 2011, Motto engaged in a
sexual relationship with the manager of the Temple Wal-Mart’s pharmacy department,
Anita Marburger. At the time, Motto was living with another employee of the store,
Bonita Campbell. Motto alleges that Marburger often groped him at work, advances
which he resisted. On October 13, 2011, Marburger and Motto had a confrontation in
which Marburger ended the relationship. Motto alleges that as he walked away,
Marburger screamed at him and hit him in the back. There was no confirming evidence
3

introduced. On October 20, 2011, Marburger told Campbell about her relationship with
Motto. Campbell confronted Motto with this information, visibly upset and crying.
Motto then confronted Marburger about the disclosure in the employee locker room. The
parties disagree as to what happened next.
Motto contends that he simply “told [Marburger] loudly, you need to stop.” Three
other Wal-Mart employees, Alex Cabrera, Linda Balthaser, and Mark DeMiere,
witnessed the confrontation in the locker room and, at Wal-Mart’s request, wrote
statements describing the incident. Cabrera wrote that Motto pointed at Marburger and
said “I am going to get you.” App. at 162a. Balthaser wrote that Motto said “I am going
to get you” and “this is not over.” App. at 160a. DeMiere, who is assistant manager of
the store, wrote that he witnessed Motto “making threatening comments” and say that “he
would get her back.” App. at 156a. To defuse the situation, DeMiere pulled Motto into
the office of store manager Daniel Hutton. At that time, Motto asked to call the police
and informed Hutton that Marburger had been sexually harassing him at work. Officer
Scott Geisler arrived at the store and spoke with Motto in the presence of Hutton and
DeMiere. Geisler’s police report did not mention the confrontation, or whether Motto
made any threatening comments to Marburger.
Hutton investigated the confrontation and reviewed the statements of Cabrera,
Balthaser, and DeMiere. He determined that Motto had made statements that constituted
threats of physical harm in violation of Wal-Mart Corporate Policy PD-48 (the
“Workplace Violence Policy”). On November 1, 2011, Hutton fired Motto for violating
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the policy. On the same day, he fired Marburger for the October 13, 2011, incident in
which she hit Motto.
II.
Motto filed suit in the District Court, originally claiming that he was
discriminated against on account of his race in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights
Act of 1964, the Pennsylvania Human Relations Act, and 42 U.S.C. §1981. Motto
referred to his 2009 performance evaluation which he claims Randy Laing, his
supervisor, told him was excellent, but which was written up as “meets expectations.”
Also, included was the allegation that a co-worker used a racially offensive word in his
presence. 2 Motto filed an amended complaint shifting his claim to termination in
retaliation for lodging complaints of discrimination with Wal-Mart and government
authorities. Wal-Mart moved for summary judgment.
The District Court scrupulously reviewed the evidence presented by both parties.
Wal-Mart claimed that Motto was terminated as a result of the incident on October 20,
2011, and in accordance with store policy. The District Court agreed.
“At oral argument, Motto conceded that Wal-Mart’s failure
to change his shift schedule in its computer system was not a
sufficiently adverse employment action to underlie a claim
of employment discrimination, and it is, therefore, no longer
before the Court.”
App. at 12a.

2

Motto did not contest Wal-Mart’s answer that a supervisor told him that he need not
work with that worker, and the co-worker was fired shortly thereafter.
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The District Court also concluded that the other evidence of possible
discrimination bore no relationship to the circumstances of Motto’s termination in
November 2011 because “[a]ll of [those] events took place before Hutton, the person who
decided to fire Motto, became store manager and years before that decision was made.”
Id. at 15a. We therefore confine our focus on that decision, which is the basis for
Motto’s amended complaint. Motto limits his retaliation claim on appeal of the District
Court’s denial of his summary judgment motion to the altercation with Marburger.
III.
We exercise plenary review over a grant of summary judgment. See Anderson v.
Wachovia Mortg. Corp., 621 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2010). In our review, we apply the
same standard a district court should use. See Brown v. Kaz, Inc., 581 F.3d 175, 179 (3d
Cir. 2009); Fuentes v. Perskie, 32 F.3d 759, 763 (3d Cir. 1994). Summary judgment
should only be granted when the record shows that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact, and we must construe the evidence in favor of the non-movant. See
Anderson, 621 F.3d at 267 (citing id. at 762 n.1).
IV.
Claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981 are generally evaluated under the McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Jones v. Sch. Dist. of Phila., 198 F.3d 403, 410,
415 (3d Cir. 1999); see also Anderson, 621 F.3d at 268. Under this framework, the
plaintiff must first establish a prima facie case of retaliation, which requires showing that:
1) s/he engaged in protected activity; 2) the employer took an adverse employment action
against him or her; and 3) there was a causal connection between the protected activity
6

and the adverse employment action. See Moore v. City of Phila., 461 F.3d 331, 340-41
(3d Cir. 2006) (citing Nelson v. Upsala Coll., 51 F.3d 383, 386 (3d Cir. 1995)). If the
plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, then the burden shifts to the employer to articulate
a legitimate, non-discriminatory, reason for the adverse employment action. See Jones,
198 F.3d at 410. If the employer can articulate such a reason, the burden shifts back to
the plaintiff to present evidence to show that the employer’s stated reason is pretextual.
Id.
Motto argues that he established a prima facie case for retaliation, based on the
facts that: 1) he was engaged in a protected activity when he complained to Hutton about
Marburger’s sexual harassment; 2) he was terminated which is an adverse employment
action; and 3) only eleven days elapsed between the complaint and the termination,
showing causation.
It is well-established that activity short of a formal letter of complaint to the
EEOC, such as “‘making complaints to management,’” can constitute protected conduct.
Barber v. CSX Distribution Servs., 68 F.3d 694, 702 (3d Cir. 1995) (quoting Sumner v.
United States Postal Serv., 899 F.2d 203, 209 (2d Cir. 1990)). Motto’s October 20th,
2011, complaint to Hutton, the store manager, about Marburger’s sexual harassment was
therefore protected activity. Moreover, it is indisputable that Motto’s termination was an
adverse employment action. See Burlington Indus., Inc. v. Ellerth, 524 U.S. 742, 749
(1998). Therefore, the only element in dispute is whether there exists a causal connection
between Motto’s complaint and his termination.
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The crux of Motto’s causation argument on this appeal is that the short time
between his complaint about sexual harassment and his discharge, eleven days, is
sufficient by itself to show a causal link. 3 We do not agree. Taken in its full context, the
timing of events in this case is not “‘unusually suggestive of retaliatory motive.’” Shaner
v. Synthes, 204 F.3d 494, 505 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126
F.3d 494, 503 (3d Cir. 1997)). Motto only complained to Hutton about Marburger’s
sexual harassment in the aftermath of the October 20, 2011, incident in the employee
locker room, a confrontation that required management to intervene. The timing was
dictated by how long it took Hutton to properly investigate the situation and reach a
decision, and so we do not find the eleven-day period unusually suggestive of retaliation.
In situations where the time between the protected activity and the retaliation does not,
standing alone, support a finding of causation, there is usually evidence of antagonism or
retaliatory animus in the intervening time. See Krouse, 126 F.3d at 503-4. No such
evidence is present here, nor is there any evidence beyond timing to suggest a causal
connection between Motto’s complaint of sexual harassment and his termination.
Without such evidence, Motto cannot establish a prima facie case of retaliation.

3

Both parties raise the issue of the relevance of the Supreme Court’s decision in Univ. of
Tex. Sw. Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 133 S. Ct. 2517 (2013), which held that a “but-for”
causation standard applies to retaliation claims under Title VII. While it is generally the
practice of this court to apply the same standard for retaliation claims under Title VII as
to claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1981, see, e.g., Jones, 198 F.3d at 410, we need not decide
the question now because we find that Motto cannot make the required showing in any
case.
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Motto argues that there exist material issues of fact that preclude summary
judgment. He argues that there is a genuine issue of material fact as to whether Motto’s
comment that “he would get [Marburger] back” was even a threat. Appellant’s Br. at 20.
He also contends that DeMiere’s statements to Officer Geisler were inconsistent with his
written statement to Hutton, and suggests that “DeMiere may have therefore authored a
false, conflicting, and contradictory statement regarding [Motto’s] conduct . . . .”
Appellant’s Br. at 21.
The facts relating to what Motto actually said in the locker room, although they
are indeed in dispute, are not material. Motto’s argument misunderstands the nature of
our inquiry. Our task is not to determine whether a reasonable jury could conclude that
Motto’s statements were not threats of violence and therefore Hutton’s decision to
terminate Motto was an incorrect application of Wal-Mart’s Workplace Violence Policy.
Instead, our task is to determine if the evidence can reasonably support an inference that
Motto’s termination was caused by his engaging in protected activity.
The record is clear that Cabrera, Balthaser, and DeMiere submitted statements to
Hutton, alleging that Motto had shouted “I am going to get you” and “this is not over.”
Even if there is dispute as to the details of what Motto shouted, there is no dispute that he
did shout at her and that the statements to that effect were submitted to Hutton who
reviewed them. The District Court concluded that the two-year period between Motto’s
complaints to the agencies and his termination and the seven-month period between
Motto’s initiation of the present suit and his termination were too long to raise an
inference of causation on their own. We agree. And given the content of those
9

statements, a reasonable jury could not conclude that Hutton fired Motto for any reason
other than because of what the three witnesses represented that Motto shouted during his
altercation with Marburger.
Even if Motto made a prima facie case, we note that the disputed facts are not
material to the pretext issue. “To discredit the employer’s proffered reason . . . the
plaintiff cannot simply show that the employer’s decision was wrong or mistaken, since
the factual dispute at issue is whether discriminatory animus motivated the employer, not
whether the employer is wise, shrewd, prudent, or competent.” Perskie, 32 F.3d at 765
(citing Ezold v. Wolf, Block, Schorr and Solis-Cohen, 983 F.2d 509, 531, 533 (3d Cir.
1992)). It does not matter what a jury might conclude, based on evaluating the credibility
of witnesses, that Motto actually said in the locker room. The only question is whether
Hutton’s stated reason for firing Motto was pretext. The material evidence is the
statements he reviewed to make his decision. The content of these statements is not in
dispute and therefore does not preclude summary judgment.
V.
For the foregoing reasons, we hereby affirm the judgment of the District Court
dismissing Motto’s retaliation claim against Wal-Mart.
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